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CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE
"I HEAR YOU KNOCKING, BUT YOU CAN'T COME IN":
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT AGAIN DECLINES TO
DECIDE WHETHER THE STATE CONSTITUTION PRECLUDES A
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 846
I. FACTS
In February 1995, Officer LeRoy Gross, a member of the James-
town, North Dakota, Police Department, searched garbage cans located
near a service alley behind Curtis Herrick's home.' Officer Gross found
a paper clip with marijuana residue on it, a sterile marijuana seed, and a
marijuana stem.2 In January 1996, Officer Gross, accompanied by
Officer Corinne Becker, again searched the garbage cans behind Her-
rick's home. 3 Officers Gross and Becker found marijuana seeds and
stems, two bent wires with marijuana residue on them, a torn check with
Herrick's name on it, and handwritten notes from a book on how to
grow marijuana.4
Using the information obtained from the two garbage can searches,
Officer Becker applied for a warrant to search Herrick's home. 5 The
magistrate asked Becker if she wanted a "no-knock," nighttime warrant;
Becker responded affirmatively. 6 The search uncovered marijuana, mari-
juana seeds and stems, equipment for indoor horticulture, a book titled
1. State v. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155, e 2, 567 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Herrick 1). Officer Gross was a
member of the Jamestown Police Department's Drug Task Force. Id. The garbage cans were on
Herrick's property, approximately three feet from the alley's edge. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. e 3. Officer Becker was a member of the Stutsman Country Narcotics Task Force. Id.
During the second search, the garbage cans were approximately four feet from the alley. Id.
4. Id.; see also State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, e 3, 588 N.W.2d 847, 848 (Herrick 11).
5. Herrick 1, 14, 567 N.W.2d at 339. Officer Becker applied for the search warrant on the same
day as the second search. Id. 115, 567 N.W.2d at 340-41.
6. Id. 4. 567 N.W.2d at 339. Under North Dakota's Controlled Substances Act, North Dakota
Century Code, Chapter 19-03. 1,
Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant, without notice of the officer's
authority and purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building,
or any part of the building, or anything therein, if the judge or magistrate issuing the
warrant has probable cause to believe that if such notice were to be given the property
sought in the case may be easily and quickly disposed of ....
N.D. CErT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1997 & Supp. 1999). During an evidentiary hearing on Herrick's
motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of his home, Officer Becker stated that a
no-knock warrant was necessary because there was evidence that marijuana was in the house and
"[m]arijuana is an easily disposed of item when it's dry, when it's processed. It could easily be
flushed down a toilet." Herrick I, 4, 567 N.W.2d at 339.
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Indoor Marijuana Horticulture, and several items of drug parapher-
nalia. 7 The officers charged Herrick with possession of a controlled sub-
stance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture,
and possession of drug paraphernalia. 8
Herrick moved to suppress the evidence, arguing: 1) the garbage
can searches violated his right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures; 2) the warrant was issued by a biased magistrate; 3) the warrant
was issued without probable cause; and 4) the issuance and execution of
the no-knock warrant violated his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 9 The trial court denied the motion. 10 Herrick entered a
conditional plea of guilty, preserving for appeal the issues argued in his
motion to suppress."1
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected Herrick's first
three arguments. 12 As to the garbage can issue, the court held that Her-
rick had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of the
garbage cans. 13 As to the biased magistrate issue, the court found no-
thing in the record demonstrating bias or prejudice on the part of the
issuing magistrate. 14 As to the probable cause issue, the court held that
items found during the garbage can searches provided sufficient proba-
ble cause for the search warrant. 15
7. Herrick 1, 5, 567 N.W.2d, at 339. When the no-knock warrant was executed, the officers
first knocked on the door to Herrick's home; then, after waiting three seconds, the officers forced the





12. Id. IN 8-15, 567 N.W.2d at 339-41.
13. Id. IN 8-10, 567 N.W.2d at 339-40 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41
(1988) (holding that warrantless searches of garbage cans set out for disposal are constitutionally valid
under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Rydberg, 519 N.W.2d 306, 309 (N.D. 1994) (holding that
placing garbage cans on or near a public alley, where they are exposed to the general public, and with
the express purposes of abandoning the contents to the trash collector, waives any privacy interest in
those contents)). In addressing the garbage can issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that the garbage cans were between two and six feet from the alley, but the court declined to
"measur[e] expectations of privacy with a ruler." Id. 1 10, 567 N.W.2d at 340.
14. Id. I 11. A warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. See State v. Ronn-
gren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 229 (N.D. 1985); see also N.D. R. C n. P. 41 (2000). The court determined,
based on the information found in the affidavit and warrant, that "the issuing magistrate was merely
trying to move the application process along when he asked [Officer] Becker if she wanted a
no-knock warrant." Herrick , 1 I1, 567 N.W.2d at 340.
15. Herrick I, V 12-15, 567 N.W.2d at 340-41. The court applied the "totality-of-the-circum-
stances" approach to review the issuing magistrate's decision "whether, given all the information
considered together, there is a fair probability contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." Id. 1 12, 567 N.W.2d at 340 (quoting Rydberg, 519 N.W.2d at 308). "[P]robable
cause to search exists if it is established that certain identifiable objects are probably connected with
criminal activity and are probably to be found at the present time at an identifiable place." State v.
Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 212 (N.D. 1988). The court determined that the evidence found in Her-
rick's garbage cans made it reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that more marijuana would be
found inside Herrick's home. Herrick 1, 14, 567 N.W.2d at 340 (quoting State v. Johnson, 531
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It was with his fourth argument that Herrick prevailed: that it was
not reasonable, under the circumstances, to issue a no-knock warrant. 16
The court began its analysis of the no-knock issue by recognizing that
one factor in determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure is
whether the officers knock and announce their presence before entering
a dwelling.17 At the same time, the court recognized that "where a threat
of ... possible destruction of evidence may exist, officers may validly
execute a no-knock warrant."18 However, the warrant to search Her-
rick's home was issued on a "per se" basis, under the court's "prior
rhetoric" approving a no-knock warrant whenever the presence of drugs
was suspected.1 9 The court overruled this per se rule and the "prior
rhetoric" on which it was founded. 20 Under the particular facts and
circumstances of Herrick 1,21 the court found it unreasonable to issue a
no-knock warrant.22
The state urged the court to adopt a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 23 The court noted that the trial court did not discuss
N.W.2d 275, 278 (N.D. 1995), which held that it is reasonable for a magistrate to conclude, from the
presence of marijuana seeds in a suspect's garbage bag, that more marijuana is probably located
inside the suspect's house).
16. Herrick I, I 16-24, 567 N.W.2d at 341-43.
17. Id. 17, 567 N.W.2d at 341 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) ("[Tjhe
common-law principle of announcement ... is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment")).
18. Id. (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936 (1995) ("[U]nannounced entry may be justified where
police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were
given")).
19. Id. IN 21, 23, 567 N.W.2d at 342-43 (citing State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872, 876 (N.D.
1993); State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (N.D. 1982); State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78
(N.D. 1973), all holding that a court, when determining whether to issue a no-knock warrant, may take
judicial notice of the fact that drugs are typically easily disposed of and that those in possession of
drugs are ordinarily on the alert to quickly destroy them when alerted to the presence of law
enforcement officers).
20. Id. 18-21, 567 N.W.2d at 341-42 (discussing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-96
(1997) (rejecting a "blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug
investigations")). Richards was decided after the issuance of the warrant to search Herrick's home.
Id. 18, 567 N.W.2d at 341.
21. 1997 N.D. 155, 567 N.W.2d 336 (Herrick 1).
22. State v. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155, 1 23, 567 N.W.2d 336, 343 (Herrick 1). "[I]n each case, it
is the duty of [the] court ... to determine whether the [particular] facts and circumstances ... justified
dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement." Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. In her application
for a no-knock warrant to search Herrick's home, Officer Becker offered no evidence other than her
belief that marijuana was present in an "easily disposed of" state and that Herrick would destroy the
evidence if the officers were required to announce their presence before entering. Herrick 1, 23,
567 N.W.2d at 343. Furthermore, the issuing magistrate did not initiate any inquiry as to why Officer
Becker held those beliefs. Id. The court determined that Officer Becker "did not meet her burden of
demonstrating the need.., for the no-knock warrant." Id. "The officers.., were looking for a grow
operation, not simply for controlled substances reflecting personal use." Id. 22, 567 N.W.2d at 342
(reviewing Officer Becker's testimony when applying for the warrant, along with the affidavit
attached to the search warrant, which included "[Il]ight bulbs, fertilizer, growing equipment"). Regard-
ing the execution of the warrant, the court agreed with the trial court that the officers executed the
warrant as a no-knock warrant, since they waited only three seconds between knocking and battering
in Herrick's door. Id. 1 24, 567 N.W.2d at 343 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, §
4.8(c), at 608 (1996) (defining a wait of two to four seconds as a no-knock execution)).
23. Herrick I, 25, 567 N.W.2d at 343 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)
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the good faith issue in its opinion denying Herrick's motion to suppress
and that, on appeal, Herrick made no response to the state's brief regard-
ing the good faith issue.24 The court declined to address the good faith
exception, as it had not been adequately briefed.25 The court reversed
both the judgment of conviction and the order denying suppression and
remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should apply in North Dakota.26
On remand, the trial court applied the United States v. Leon27 good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that the evidence was
admissible. 28 Herrick appealed the trial court's reinstatement of his
convictions. 29 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the Leon
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to Herrick's
case.30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When law enforcement officers execute a warrant to search a dwell-
ing, they are generally required to knock and announce their presence
and authority before entering, unless circumstances exist which allow the
officers to forego the announcement requirement. 31 Such circumstances
(creating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule where officers' reliance on a magistrate's
determination of probable cause was "objectively reasonable")).
24. Id.
25. Id. 26, 567 N.W.2d at 344.
26. Id. 27-28. The court instructed the parties that, should an appeal of the remand decision be
taken, they were "to brief the question of whether [the court] should recognize a good faith exception,
and, if so, whether it should be applied in [Herrick's] case." Id. 27. Justice Meschke dissented from
the remand. Id. 31 (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting). Citing Leon, Meschke stated that "the
officers had no reasonable grounds to seek a no-knock warrant," and therefore "their application was
'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely un-
reasonable."' Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 (holding that "in some circumstances the officer
will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued" and that an
officer could not, in objective good faith, rely on a warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable") (footnote and
citations omitted)).
27. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
28. State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. I, 7, 588 N.W.2d 847, 848 (Herrick I) (citing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)). In his memorandum opinion, Judge Bekken held "it is right and
timely that the 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule be adopted." Brief of Appellant at A.19,
State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847 (Nos. 980082-84) (Herrick 11).
29. Herrick Ii, 7, 588 N.W.2d at 849. Herrick argued that the trial court erroneously adopted
the good faith exception and that the trial court "further erred in finding that the 'good faith' exception
applie[d] to [Herrick's] case despite the fact that the affidavit . . . lacked the requisite probable
cause." Brief of Appellant at 4, Herrick II (Nos. 980082-84). Herrick further argued that, under the
state constitution, the North Dakota Supreme Court should not adopt the good faith exception. Id.
30. Herrick II, 28, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
31. See generally Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934-36 (1995) (holding that the knock-and
announce requirement is an element in determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment and listing circumstances in which a search or seizure may be constitutionally
valid despite a prior announcement).
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exist, for example, if officers are executing what is known as a "no-
knock" warrant. 32 If law enforcement officers violate the knock-and-
announce requirement, or if a warrant is invalid, the search or seizure
violates the constitutional freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 33 If a search or seizure is unconstitutional, evidence obtained
during that search or seizure will normally be excluded as evidence at
trial, unless one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies. 34 One
such exception, created by the Supreme Court in 1984, has become
known as the "good faith" exception. 35
A. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT
The knock-and-announce requirement ordinarily requires law
enforcement officers to knock and announce their presence and authori-
ty before entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant. 36 There are
exceptions to the requirement, however, which allow law enforcement
officers to enter unannounced under certain circumstances. 37
1. Origins of the Knock-and-Announce Requirement
In Wilson v. Arkansas,38 the United States Supreme Court traced the
knock-and-announce requirement back to the 1603 English decision
called Semayne's Case,39 which most courts regard as the origin of the
requirement. 40 Semayne's Case held that a sheriff, when executing the
King's process, "may break the party's house ... if otherwise he cannot
32. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1997 & Supp. 1999) (authorizing the execu-
tion of a warrant without prior announcement under certain circumstances).
33. See generally Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 (holding that the knock-and-announce requirement "is
an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment"); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 486 (1965) (holding that a warrant lacking the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment
was constitutionally invalid).
34. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible, both in federal and state courts); Keith A. Fabi, The
Exclusionary Rule: Not the "Expressed Juice of the Woolly-Headed Thistle, " 35 BUFF. L. REV. 937,
946-48 (1986) (discussing exceptions to the exclusionary rule).
35. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained in
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate is admissible
at trial, even when the warrant is subsequently found to he invalid).
36. See generally Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 (holding that an unannounced entry may he unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment).
37. See generally id. at 935-36 (listing situations in which "the presumption in favor of announce-
ment necessarily would give way to contrary considerations").
38. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
39. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
40. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932 (1995) (citing Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b,
77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603)). Wilson noted that the knock and announce principle may predate
even Semayne's Case. Id. at 932 n.2 (citing Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 196).
The principle has roots in a statute enacted in 1275, which was itself merely an affirmance of the
then-existing commonlaw. Id. (citing Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 196).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:123
enter." 41 Before doing so, however, the sheriff shall disclose the reason
for his presence and request that the door to the house be opened. 42
This principle quickly became part of early American law, finding a
home in state constitutional provisions, statutes, and court decisions. 43
In North Dakota, the knock-and-announce requirement is codified
in North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08.44 In interpreting this
section, the North Dakota Supreme Court has determined that "[t]he
primary policies underlying the knock-and-announce rule are the protec-
tion of privacy in the home and the prevention of violent confron-
tations." 45  The first of those policies-the right to privacy in one's
home-is protected not only by the Fourth Amendment, but, in North
Dakota, by statutory authority. 46 As "one of the unique values of our
society," the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the right to
privacy in one's home should not be grudgingly upheld. 47 The second
of those policies-the prevention of violent confrontations-is implicat-
ed by an unannounced entry. 48 Such an entry may provoke surprised
occupants to take defensive, potentially violent measures they would not
have taken had they known the police had a search warrant. 49
After acknowledging "the longstanding common-law endorsement
of the practice of announcement," the United States Supreme Court in
41. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
42. Id.
43. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933. Some constitutional provisions and statutes incorporated the prin-
ciple generally, providing that "the common law of England" shall remain in force. Id. Some statutes
specifically embraced the principle, providing that if admittance was refused, breaking the door was
permissible. Id.
44. North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08 provides:
An officer directed to serve a search warrant may break open an outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of the house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant,
(a) if, after notice of the officer's authority and purpose, the officer is refused admit-
tance, or (b) without notice of the officer's authority and purpose if the warrant was
issued by a magistrate who is learned in the law and who has inserted a direction therein
that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such notice. The magistrate may
so direct only upon written or recorded oral petition and proof under oath, to the
magistrate's satisfaction, that the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or
disposed of, or that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, if such
notice were to be given.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (1991 & Supp. 1999).
45. See State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1985) (defining a nonconsensual entry
through an open main door as a breaking, under ordinary circumstances, under North Dakota Century
Code section 29-29-08).
46. Id. at 784.
47. Id. at 783-84 (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (discussing the deeply
rooted heritage of the requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (holding that a warrantless search "demands
exceptional circumstances")).
48. Id. at 782.
49. Id. (citing Miller, 357 U.S. at 313 n.12 (reasoning that announcement protects the police them-
selves against being mistaken for prowlers and being shot down by a fearful householder)).
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Wilson "squarely held" that the common law knock and announce prin-
ciple is an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.5 0
The framers of the Fourth Amendment believed that the method of entry
is one of the factors in determining whether a search or seizure was
reasonable. 51 Therefore, an unannounced entry might be unreasonable
under certain circumstances. 52 At the same time, the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry is flexible and must balance the principle of
announcement against "countervailing law enforcement principles." 53
2. The "Per Se" Drug Exception to the Knock-and-Announce
Requirement
North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) outlines two of
the "countervailing law enforcement principles" that must be balanced
against the principle of announcement: destruction or disposal of evi-
dence and danger to law enforcement officers or others.5 4 In a trio of
cases-State v. Loucks,55 State v. Borden,56 and State v. Knudson57-the
North Dakota Supreme Court created a per se drug exception to the
statutory knock-and-announce requirement of North Dakota Century
Code section 19-03.1-32(3).58
In Loucks, a 1973 case, police officers obtained a no-knock warrant
to search the defendant's apartment. 59 The affidavit for the warrant
50. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. In cataloging some of the circumstances that may justify an unannounced entry, the Court
included "circumstances presenting a threat of violence" or where there is "reason to believe that
evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given." Id. at 936.
54. North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) provides:
Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant, without notice of the officer's
authority and purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building,
or any part of the building, or anything therein, if the judge or magistrate issuing the war-
rant has probable cause to believe that if such notice were to be given the property
sought in the case may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that danger to
the life or limb of the officer or another may result, and has included in the warrant a
direction that the officer executing it is not required to give such notice. Any officers
acting under such warrant, as soon as practicable after entering the premises, shall
identify themselves and state the purpose of entering the premises and the authority for
doing so.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1997 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
55. 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973).
56. 316 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1982).
57. 499 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1993).
58. See State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872, 876 (N.D. 1993); State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93,
96-97 (N.D. 1982); State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973), all holding that a court,
when determining whether to issue a no-knock warrant, may take judicial notice of the fact that drugs
are typically easily disposed of and that those in possession of drugs ordinarily quickly destroy them
when alerted to the presence of law enforcement officers.
59. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d at 773.
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contained information from an informant that, in the four days prior to
his giving the information, he had observed marijuana at the defendant's
apartment. 60 The affidavit also stated the officer's knowledge that
"drugs might easily be disposed of or destroyed." 61 However, the
affidavit did not expressly state that if the officers were required to give
notice before executing the warrant, the evidence sought "would likely"
suffer such fate.62 The court held, however, that "[i]t is common knowl-
edge that drugs may be easily disposed of," common knowledge of
which a court "may take judicial notice." 63 Therefore, it was not
"absolutely essential" that an officer specifically state in an affidavit
that drugs would probably be disposed of or destroyed if the officers
gave notice before entering. 64 Accordingly, the court ruled that the
judge who issued the warrant had probable cause to issue the no-knock
warrant. 65
Borden, a 1982 case, reversed a district court ruling which held a
no-knock warrant invalid.66 The district court ruled that Loucks was inap-
plicable because the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the defen-
dants were in possession of a large quantity of drugs. 67 The district
court determined that such evidence could not have given the magistrate
probable cause to believe that the drugs might be easily disposed of or
60. Id.
61. Id. at 774.
62. Id. at 777.
63. Id. at 777-78.
64. Id. at 777.
65. Id. at 778. One of the issues the court had to decide was whether the judge who issued the
warrant-a judge of the county court of increased jurisdiction-had authority, under North Dakota
Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3), to issue a no-knock search warrant. Id. at 776-77. Had the war-
rant been issued under North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08, there would not have been suf-
ficient authority, as the statute as it then existed limited authority to issue no-knock warrants to district
judges. Id. at 776. However, North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3), as it then existed,
granted authority to issue no-knock warrants to "judges or magistrates." Id. at 776-77. The court
determined that "judge or magistrate" under North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) in-
cluded the judge of a county court of increased jurisdiction. Id. at 777. Though the two statutes were
in conflict, the court determined that North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) prevailed over
North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08 for two reasons: 1) North Dakota Century Code section
19-03.1-32 was enacted later (1971) than North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08 (1967) and 2)
North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08 is "a general statute dealing with issuance of all search
warrants," while North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32 "deals with a specific subject: con-
trolled substances." Id. Where two statutes are in conflict, "the one enacted last prevails." Id. Fur-
thermore, "a statute dealing comprehensively with a special subject" prevails over "a general statute."
Id. North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08 has since been amended to grant authority to issue
no-knock warrants to "magistrate[s] who [are] learned in the law." N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08
(1991 & Supp. 1999).
66. State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1982).
67. Id. at 96. Police officers, conducting surveillance in an motel room adjacent to the one the
defendants were renting, overheard a conversation in which "25 pounds" was referenced. Id. at 94.
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destroyed. 68 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed. 69 The majori-
ty of the evidence pointed to the conclusion that the defendants were in
possession of "probably less than two pounds" of marijuana, as well as
"other, 'hard' drugs." 70 Therefore, under Loucks, the magistrate had
sufficient probable cause to issue a no-knock warrant. 71
Finally, in the 1983 case of Knudson, an officer obtained a no-
knock warrant to search the defendant's residence. 72 In his affidavit, the
officer testified that an informant had seen several one-quarter ounce
baggies of marijuana at the defendant's residence and that, in the
officer's experience, the defendant would attempt to hide or destroy the
evidence if the officers knocked and announced their presence before
executing the search warrant. 73 The court reasoned that "those in posses-
sion of controlled substances ordinarily are on the alert to destroy the
typically easily disposable evidence quickly at the first sign of a law
enforcement officer's presence." 74 Therefore, as in Loucks and Borden,
there was probable cause for the issuance of the no-knock warrant. 75
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court held in Richards v.
Wisconsin76 that a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule was
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.77 Richards reversed a
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had held that "circum-
stances justifying a no-knock warrant are always present in felony drug
cases." 78 The Court found that creating such a per se rule for a general
68. Id. at 96.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 97. The hotel security guard overheard the defendants say that they had "two pounds
to get rid of." Id. Several persons visited the room in which the defendants were staying, including
persons with alleged drug involvement. Id. at 96-97. Police officers overhead money being discussed
during these visits. Id. at 97. In a wastebasket outside the defendants' motel room, officers dis-
covered hypodermic syringe caps and bloody facial tissues. Id. at 94.
71. Id. at 97 (following State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973)).
72. State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872, 873 (N.D. 1993).
73. Id. at 873. The informant had also seen firearms at the defendant's residence and a dog ken-
neled near the front door to the residence. Id. The officer applying for the warrant testified that these
facts concerned him. Id.
74. Id. at 876 (citing Borden, 316 N.W.2d at 97; Loucks, 209 N.W.2d at 777-78).
75. Id. The court did not discuss the firearms and the dog in determining that probable cause
existed to issue a no-knock warrant. Id. It did, however, mention them in determining that "reason-
able cause" existed to authorize a nighttime search. Id. at 875; see also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41
(2000)(authorizing nighttime searches only when "reasonable cause" is shown). The court first
established that "reasonable cause" is synonymous with "probable cause" under Rule 41(c) of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and that a showing that evidence "may be quickly and
easily disposed of" is sufficient to establish probable cause for a nighttime search. Knudson, 499
N.W.2d at 875 (citing State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 538-39 (N.D. 1979) (holding that a belief that
evidence will probably be removed or destroyed, because easily disposed of, establishes reasonable
cause to justify a nighttime search)). It then agreed with the issuing magistrate's decision to give
"little, if any, weight to [the officer's] concern over the presence of firearms and the dog." Id.
76. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
77. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 (1997).
78. Id. at 390 (citing State v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218, 225 (1996)). The Court noted that
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category of criminal behavior presents two serious problems. 79 The first
is overgeneralization.80 While many drug investigations present risks to
officer safety and evidence preservation, not every investigation presents
those risks to the extent sufficient to justify a no-knock warrant.81 The
second is the ease with which similar exceptions could be made for any
category of criminal investigation in which officer safety or evidence
preservation was at risk.82 The Court thus held that a no-knock entry is
justified only when law enforcement officers have "a reasonable suspi-
cion that knocking and announcing their presence ... would be danger-
ous or futile" or may allow evidence to be destroyed. 83 Although the
Richards Court did not exclude the evidence obtained pursuant to the
warrant, its holding suggests that exclusion would be the remedy under
the exclusionary rule created by the Supreme Court.84
B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 85
Nowhere in its text does the Fourth Amendment provide a remedy for its
violation, much less a remedy requiring the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained as a result of that violation. 86 Therefore, the Supreme Court has
several other state courts-including North Dakota-had adopted similar rules. Id. at 390-91 n.1
(citing Loucks, 209 N.W.2d at 777-78).
79. Id. at 392.
80. Id. at 393.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 394.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 396 (affirming denial of the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers' conduct
was based on a reasonable suspicion that the drugs would be destroyed, making it constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment).
85. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
86. Id. Historians believe this is because the framers of the United States Constitution drafted the
Fourth Amendment as protection against both general warrants and writs of assistance. See Potter
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1983) (discussing the
history of the Fourth Amendment). The framers had no experience with warrantless searches, and
thus they believed that the Fourth Amendment, by providing "a framework for the issuance of search
warrants," provided the necessary protection against unconstitutional searches. See Richard E.
Hillary II, Arizona v. Evans and the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: The Exception is




developed the exclusionary rule as the remedy the Fourth Amendment
does not expressly provide. 87
1. The Origin and Development of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule-in its constitutional context-provides that
evidence obtained in violation of a person's constitutional rights is inad-
missible as evidence against that person. 88 The exclusionary rule has its
foundation in three Supreme Court cases: Boyd v. United States,89
Adams v. New York,90 and Weeks v. United States.9 1
In 1886, the Supreme Court in Boyd held that compelling the
production of a person's private books and papers as evidence is a
violation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 92 In its reasoning,
the Court discussed an "intimate relation" between the Fourth and the
Fifth Amendments, since "the 'unreasonable searches and seizures'
condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself."93 Com-
pelling the production of a person's private books and papers in a civil
forfeiture suit, the Court determined, "is compelling [that person] to be
a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to
the [C]onstitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and an
unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 94
In 1904, the Supreme Court in Adams held that courts need not
inquire into how evidence was obtained, as long as the evidence is "per-
tinent to the issue" being decided. 95 The Adams court distinguished
87. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution should not have been admitted at trial).
88. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible, both in federal and state courts).
89. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
90. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
91. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
92. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886). Although the Court characterized the
proceeding as being criminal in nature, Boyd in fact involved a civil forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 634.
Thus, though the act under which the proceeding was brought "expressly exclude[d] criminal proceed-
ings from its operation (though embracing civil suits for penalties and forfeitures)," the act was
"within the spirit of both" the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 633.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 634-35.
95. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1904). In Adams, police officers executed a wa-
rrant authorizing the search of the defendant's office for "policy slips" (lottery tickets). Id. at 588.
Along with approximately 3,500 policy slips, the officers seized "certain other papers ... for the pur-
pose of identifying certain handwriting of the defendant... and also to show that the papers belonged
to the defendant and were in the same custody as the policy slips." Id. The defendant claimed that
"other papers" taken in a search for instruments of crime were not admissible into evidence. Id. at
598. The Court rejected this argument with what is best described as a "plain view seizure" analysis.
Id.; see generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (reaffirming that warrantless sei
2000] 133
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Boyd by reading it to hold merely that "one can[not] be compelled to
produce his books and papers in a suit which seeks the forfeiture of his
estate on pain of having the statements of government's counsel as to the
contents thereof taken as true and used as testimony for the govern-
ment." 96 Finding no violation of either the Fourth or the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Court determined that the issue before it was one of evidence,
not constitutional law. 9 7 As such, the challenged evidence, being
"pertinent to the issue," was admissible. 98
Ten years later, the Supreme Court in Weeks held that private letters
and papers illegally obtained must be returned to the owner if the ac-
cused has made a timely application for their return. 99 The Weeks Court
distinguished Adams on the ground that, while Adams' objection to the
introduction of evidence did not come until trial, Weeks filed a petition
for the return of his property before trial.100 As such, the issue was
whether private letters and papers, seized without a warrant, can be ad-
mitted as evidence when the accused has made a timely application for
their return. 101 The Court held that allowing private letters and papers to
be so used would render the protections of the Fourth Amendment
meaningless.102 "The efforts of the courts," the Court reasoned, "are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of [the] great principles ... embodi[ed]
in the fundamental law of the land." 103
Until the 1920s, the exclusionary rule was narrow in scope, as the
broad holding of Adams-that any relevant evidence was admissible
regardless of the manner in which it was obtained-was narrowly limited
by the holdings of Boyd and Weeks.l 0 4 The further development of the
zures are valid under certain circumstances). The Court analogized the case before it to the legal
seizure--and receipt into evidence-of burglars' tools under a warrant to search for stolen property.
Adams, 192 U.S. at 598. The Court's application of a plain view seizure analysis appears ill-founded,
however, as the Court did not seem to dispute that the "certain other papers" seized had "no relation
whatsoever" to the crime alleged. Id. at 587-88. Unlike papers having "no relation whatsoever" to a
crime, the illegal nature of burglars' tools is readily apparent. Id. at 587; see generally Horton, 496
U.S. at 136 (holding that one of the requirements for a plain view seizure is that the incriminating
nature of the items seized must be "immediately apparent").
96. Adams, 192 U.S. at 597.
97. Id. at 594.
98. Id. at 595-96.
99. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). While the defendant was being arrested at
his place of work, other police officers entered the defendant's house without a warrant. Id. at 386.
They searched the defendant's room and seized "various papers and articles," which they turned over
to a United States Marshal. Id. Later that day, the marshal, accompanied by police officers (none of
whom had a warrant), conducted a second search of the defendant's room, seizing "certain letters
and envelopes." Id.
100. Id. at 396.
101. Id. at 393.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Court's holding was limited to the papers seized by the United States Marshal during
the second search. Id. at 398. The papers seized by the police officers during the first search were
not subject to exclusion under the Fourth Amendment, as "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to
individual misconduct of [state] officials." Id.
104. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398; Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1904); Boyd v.
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exclusionary rule is found in another trio of Supreme Court cases:
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,10 5 Gouled v. United States,106
and Agnello v. United States.107
In 1920, the Supreme Court in Silverthorne held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits not merely "physical possession" of illegally
obtained evidence, but also "any advantages that the Government can
gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act." 108 In
Silverthorne, the government copied and photographed papers and
books it had illegally obtained.109 The trial court ordered the return of
the originals and impounded the copies and photographs. 110 The gov-
ernment then used the information it had obtained to issue subpoenas to
produce the originals. "'1 The Court held that unless the Fourth Amend-
ment is to be reduced "to a form of words," illegally obtained evidence
must "not be used at all." 112
In 1921, the Supreme Court held in Gouled that the Adams
rule-"that courts in criminal trials will not pause to determine how the
possession of evidence tendered has been obtained"-although impor-
tant, was merely procedural and "must not be allowed for any technical
reason to prevail over a constitutional right."113 In Gouled, the accused
did not petition for the return of illegally seized papers until trial, as it
was not until one of the papers was entered into evidence that the ac-
cused knew the papers had been seized.11 4 The Court determined that
the accused's objection to the evidence was timely, as it came promptly
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
105. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
106. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
107. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
108. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920). Silverthorne thus gave
birth to the "derivative evidence" or "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Id.; see also Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (referring to evidence obtained as a result of illegal police
activity as "fruit of the poisonous tree"). Silverthorne was also the first Supreme Court case to discuss
the "independent source" doctrine in detail by stating that "[i]f knowledge of [the illegally obtained
facts] is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge
gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed." Silverthorne, 251
U.S. at 392; see discussion infra Part II.B.3.
109. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391. While the defendants were in custody, federal law enforce-
ment officers, "without a shadow of authority," seized "all of the books, papers, and documents" from
the defendants' office. Id. at 390.
110. Id. at 391.
11. Id.
112. Id. at 392. The government had argued that the Fourth Amendment "covers the physical
possession [of illegally obtained evidence] but not any advantages that the Government can gain"
from that evidence. Id. at 391.
113. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1921).
114. Id. at 304-05. A government representative, who was also a business acquaintance of the
defendant, entered the defendant's office under the guise of making a friendly call. Id. at 304. While
the defendant was absent, the government representative seized several documents without a warrant.
Id.
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upon the first notice to the accused that the government was in posses-
sion of the papers.115 As such, the trial court "should have inquired as
to the origin of the ... evidence." 116
Finally, in 1925, the Supreme Court in Agnello again held that
procedural rules (i.e., the Adams rule) must not prevail over constitution-
al rights.'l 7 In Agnello, the accused failed to petition for the return of
illegally seized drugs, because he contended that he never possessed
them. 118 The Court held it unreasonable to require the accused to peti-
tion for the return of property that he maintained he never possessed. 119
Where the government seeks to use evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the person whose rights have been violated may
immediately invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment, without first
petitioning for the return of the illegally seized property.120
2. Application of the Exclusionary Rule to the States
In 1949, the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado12' began the
process of applying the exclusionary rule to the states. 122 The Court
reasoned that "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is . . .
implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such is enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 123 Wolf, however, did not make exclusion a mandatory
remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that it was not "an
essential ingredient of the right."' 124 States were free to adopt other
115. Id. at 305.
116. Id. at 313. The Court held that taking the papers violated the Fourth Amendment and that
their admission into evidence violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 305-06.
117. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1925) (citing Gouled, 255 U.S. at 313).
118. Id. at 33-34. Federal agents arrested the defendant along with several other individuals
after an apparent narcotics transaction had taken place. Id. at 29. While the defendant was being
taken to the police station, other agents executed a warrantless search of the defendant's house and
found a can of cocaine. Id. The Court rejected an argument that the warrantless search was valid as
incident to the arrest. d. at 30. "[Tlhe right does not extend" beyond "the place where the arrest is
made," and the defendant's house was "several blocks distant" from where the arrest took place. Id.
at 30-31.
119. Id. at 34.
120. Id.
121. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
122. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures is enforceable against the states through the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).
123. Id. Justice Black, in concurrence, agreed with the majority on this point, repeating his "be-
lief that the 14th Amendment was intended to make the Fourth Amendment in its entirety applicable to
the states." Id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 29, 33. Justice Black also agreed with the majority "that the federal exclusionary rule
is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence." Id. at 39-40
(Black, J., concurring). Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that a Fourth Amendment without an
exclusionary rule would have "no effective sanction." Id. at 40 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
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remedies, so long as the remedies were "consistently enforced [and]
equally effective."125
In 1960, the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United Statesl26 overruled
what had become known as the "silver platter doctrine," which allowed
evidence illegally obtained by state officers to be used at a federal
trial.127 This doctrine stemmed from a combination of two rules: 1)
state officers cannot violate the Fourth Amendment and 2) prior to
Elkins, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was required only for
violations of the Fourth, not the Fourteenth, Amendment. 128 The Court
in Elkins found no logical distinction between evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and evidence seized in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 129 It further reasoned that a rule which re-
quired federal courts to differentiate on such a basis would be "curious-
ly ambivalent" and would rest upon an arbitrary basis. 130 Elkins held
that "evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if
conducted by federal officers, would have violated . . . the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible . . . in a federal criminal trial."
131
Rutledge agreed with Justice Douglas that "the [Fourth] Amendment without the [exclusionary]
sanction is a dead letter." Id. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge was of "[t]he view that
the Fourth Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence illegally obtained." Id. at 48.
125. Id. at 31. Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, dissented, arguing that the only alterna-
tive to the exclusionary sanction "is no sanction at all." Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice
Murphy went on to expose the weaknesses of the alternate remedies: criminal prosecution of violators
would require unrealistic levels of self-scrutiny on the part of government prosecutors, and trespass
actions will ordinarily result in no or minimal damages, even if the aggrieved party prevails. Id. at
42-44.
126. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
127. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960). The Court overruled the silver platter
doctrine by invoking its supervisory power, which allows the Court to formulate rules of evidence to
be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. Id. at 216.
128. Id. at 210-13. The silver platter doctrine did not apply where state officials acted in co-
operation with federal officials or where state officials acted on behalf of the United States. Id.
Technically, after Elkins, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was still required only for violations
of the Fourth, not the 14th, Amendment, at least in state courts; it was not until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961), that evidence obtained in violation of the 14th Amendment became inadmissible in
state courts. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
129. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker,
dissented on the ground that the majority disregarded "the essential difference ...between the
particularities of the first eight Amendments and the fundamental nature of what constitutes due
process." Id. at 240 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 215.
131. Id. at 223. Justice Frankfurter further disagreed with the majority's "troublesome and
uncertain new criterion"-"the 'unconstitutionality' of [state] police conduct, as distinguished from its
mere illegality under state or federal law." Id. at 243 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The more certain
approach, Justice Frankfurter maintained, is to require exclusion on the basis of illegal conduct,
"whether or not the rule of conduct flows directly from the constitution." Id. at 244. "After all, it
makes not the slightest difference from the point of view of the admissibility of evidence whether what
a federal officer does is simply illegal or illegal because unconstitutional." Id. at 245.
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One year later, the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio132 overruled
Wolf and held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment is also inadmissible in a state court.133 The Court discussed Wolf,
deciding that "factual considerations" were the reason the exclusionary
rule was not imposed against the states for violations of the Fourth
Amendment. 134 In particular, the Court in Wolf had been reluctant to
interfere with the experience of the states as to other remedies providing
for protection against Fourth Amendment violations. 135 Mapp recog-
nized "[t]he obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the
protection of other remedies,"136 and held that the Fourth Amendment
is enforceable against the states "by the same sanction of exclusion as is
used against the Federal Government." 137
3. The Derivative Evidence Rule Exceptions
The exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally obtained evi-
dence, but all evidence derived from that illegally obtained evidence.1 38
In Nardone v. United States,139 this application became known as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 140 Nonetheless, there are three
exceptions under which the government may use derivative evidence in
132. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
133. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Justice Harlan, dissenting, found fault with the
majority's "summary reversal of Wolf, without argument." Id. at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[A]
case where the question [of overruling Wolf] was briefed not at all and argued only extremely
tangentially," Justice Harlan maintained, "furnishes a singularly inappropriate occasion for
reconsideration of that decision." Id. at 674 nn.5 & 6, 676.
134. Id. at 650-51 (discussing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-29).
135. Id. at 651-52 (discussing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30-32). Justice Harlan disagreed; in his view
"this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States with an adamant rule which may
embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in law enforcement." Id. at 681 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 652 (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 655. The Court further held that "the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 657. Justice Black, concurring, reaffirmed his view that
"the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any provision expressly precluding the use of [illegally
obtained] evidence," and that it was "extremely doubtful that such a provision could properly be
inferred from nothing more than the basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring). Nonetheless, by considering "the close interrelationship between
Fourth and Fifth Amendment," Justice Black found "a constitutional basis ... which not only justifies
but actually requires the exclusionary rule." Id. at 662 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633
(1914), which recognized an "intimate relation" between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). In his
dissent, Justice Harlan expressed doubt "that the Fourteenth Amendment empowers this Court to mould
state remedies effectuating the right to freedom from 'arbitrary intrusion by the police."' Id. at 682
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920) (holding that the
protection of the Constitution covers not only the physical possession of illegally obtained evidence, but
also any advantages that the government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden
act).
139. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
140. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (holding that the accused has the burden
of proving that the evidence against him or her is "fruit of the poisonous tree").
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its case in chief: 1) the independent source exception, 2) the inevitable
discovery exception, and 3) the attenuation or purged taint exception.141
In Silverthorne Lumber Co., a 1920 case, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that evidence obtained through an independent source could be
admissible. 142 The Court explained that facts obtained from illegally ob-
tained evidence are not "sacred and inaccessible," but rather they "may
be proved like any others" if the government learns of them through an
independent source. 143 In 1978, in United States v. Ceccolini,144 the
Court held that illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the govern-
ment can show that it would have obtained the evidence even without the
illegal activity.145
The second exception, divulged in the 1984 case of Nix v. Wil-
liams,146 provides that illegally obtained evidence is admissible if the
evidence inevitably would have been obtained through legal law enforce-
ment techniques.147 The burden to show inevitable discovery is on the
government, which must satisfy a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard.148 The Court in Nix discussed the "functional similarity" between
the "inevitable discovery" doctrine and the "independent source" doc-
trine, in terms of the derivative evidence rule.149 The premise underlying
the derivative evidence rule is that the government should be put in the
same position as if there had been no error or violation, but should not
be put in a worse position.150 Just as excluding evidence that could have
been obtained from an independent source would put the government in
141. See Fabi, supra note 34, at 946-48 (discussing exceptions to the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine).
142. Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392; see discussion supra Part II.B.1.
143. Id.
144. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
145. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1978). Ceccolini involved the discovery
of a live witness, as opposed to an inanimate piece of evidence. Id. at 270. As such, the Court
concluded that "the exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance." Id. at 280.
146. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
147. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). In Nix, officers obtained incriminating state-
ments from a murder defendant in violation of his right to counsel. Id. at 437; see also Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (holding that statements elicited during an interrogation which violated
the defendant's right to counsel should not have been admitted into evidence at trial). The statements
led the officers to the location of the body of the murder victim. Nix, 467 U.S. at 436. The Court held
that a large-scale search for the body, which was called off when the defendant disclosed the body's
location, would inevitably have found the body. Id. at 449-50. Thus, "there [was] no nexus [between
the police misconduct and the discovery of the body] sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence
[was] admissible." Id. at 448.
148. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall dissented, reasoning that
because the inevitable discovery doctrine rests on a hypothetical, rather than factual, basis, the govern-
ment should be required to satisfy a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof before being al-
lowed to use evidence obtained as a result of inevitable discovery. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 443-44.
150. Id. at 443.
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a worse position, so too would excluding evidence that would inevitably
have been discovered. 151
Finally, in 1939, the Supreme Court in Nardone held that, although
there may be a causal connection between the illegal activity and the
evidence thereby obtained, "such connection may have become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint."1 52 This doctrine was applied in
Wong Sun v. United States,153 which held that a defendant's admission
was not "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
unlawful invasion."1 54 However, the admission of a second defendant,
given "voluntarily several days later," had "become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint."1 55
C. THE "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Until 1984, illegally obtained evidence could be used in the prose-
cution's case in chief only if it fell within one of the derivative evidence
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.156 If not, use of the evidence was
limited to certain forms of impeachment and questioning of a grand jury
witness. 157 In 1984, however, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case
of Leon, created the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,
151. Id. at 443-44.
152. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
153. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
154. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,486 (1963). The Court rejected the argument that
the defendant's statements to federal narcotics agents, made shortly after the agents' illegally entry
into the defendant's living quarters and warrantless arrest of the defendant, were "sufficiently an act
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Id. at 486. As such, both the
defendant's statements and the narcotics which the agents discovered as a result of those statements,
were inadmissible against that defendant. Id. at 487-88. Justice Clark, dissenting, submitted that the
officers reasonably believed that the first defendant had committed a felony and that his arrest was
lawfully justified to prevent his fleeing the officers. Id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting). Therefore,
because there was no "poisonous tree" and therefore no "fruit of the poisonous tree," the statements
and the narcotics were admissible against the first defendant. Id.
155. Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). The narcotics were also admissible against
the second defendant, as the agents' seizure of the narcotics "invaded no right of privacy of person or
premises which would entitle [the second defendant] to object to its use at trial." Id. at 492.
156. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984) (discussing the inevitable discovery excep-
tion); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 (applying the attenuation or purged taint exception); Silverthorne
Lumber Co.. Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (discussing the independent source
exception).
157. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (holding that illegally obtained evi-
dence may be used to impeach statements made by defendants on cross examination); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (holding that a grand jury witness cannot refuse to answer
questions on the ground that they were based on illegally obtained evidence); Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (holding that illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach contradictory
statements made by defendants on direct examination).
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which allowed the use of illegally obtained evidence in the prosecution's
case in chief under certain circumstances. 158
1. The United States v. Leon Decision
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in reason-
able reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate is
admissible in the prosecution's case in chief, even if the warrant is subse-
quently held to be invalid. 159 The Court reaffirmed its rationale from an
earlier decision, United States v. Calandra,160 holding that the exclu-
sionary rule is "a judicially designed remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."1
61
On the basis of this deterrence rationale, the Court provided three
reasons why the exclusionary rule should not apply to judges and
magistrates, but only to law enforcement officers. 162 First, the exclusion-
ary rule was not designed to punish judge and magistrate error, but
rather "to deter police misconduct." 163 Second, although some judges
and magistrates are nothing more than "rubber stamps" for the police,
this problem was not significant enough to apply "the extreme sanction
of exclusion." 164 No evidence existed to suggest an inclination on the
part of judges and magistrates to "ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment." 165 Third, judges and magistrates ideally are impartial and
therefore they cannot be expected to be deterred by the possibility that a
certain piece of evidence will be excluded. 166
As to the application of the exclusionary rule to law enforcement
officers, Leon held that the exclusionary rule should only be applied
where its purposes will be furthered, where it will "alter the behavior of
individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their depart-
ments." 167 Such circumstances do not exist, the Court reasoned, where
law enforcement officers reasonably believe their conduct was not in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 68 This is particularly true, the
158. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984). Both Nix and Leon were decided in
1984; Nix was decided on June 11, but Leon was not decided until July 5. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897;
Nix, 467 U.S. at 431.
159. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 922.
160. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
161. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
162. Id. at 916.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 916 n.14.
165. Id. at 916.
166. Id. at 916 n.15.
167. Id. at 918.
168. Id. (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975) (discussing the proposition that
2000]
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Court continued, where law enforcement officers act "with objective
good faith" and within the scope of a search warrant issued by a judge
or magistrate.169 The judge or magistrate, not the law enforcement of-
ficer, has the responsibility to determine the existence of probable cause
and to prepare a warrant in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. 170
Applying the exclusionary rule would therefore penalize the law enforce-
ment officer, not for the officer's own error, but for that of the judge or
magistrate.171 Such a penalty "cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." 172
Leon also set forth four situations to which the good faith exception
would not apply.173 The first is when the issuing judge or magistrate was
misled by information, the falsity of which the affiant knew or recklessly
disregarded.174 Second, when the issuing judge or magistrate failed to
act in a neutral and detached manner, and instead acted as "an adjunct
law enforcement officer," good faith will not save the warrant.175 Third,
there can be no good faith when the affidavit on which the warrant was
based was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."1 76 Finally, good faith
cannot apply when the warrant was "so facially deficient-i.e., in failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that
the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid."'177
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed
with the majority that the exclusionary rule is not "constitutionally
compelled" by the Fourth Amendment.178 He then discussed the
empirical judgment upon which the majority opinion was based; namely,
that exclusion does not significantly affect the conduct of "officers
act[ing] in objectively reasonable reliance on search warrants."1 79 He
warned, however, that because the majority opinion rested upon an
empirical judgment, the assumptions upon which the opinion was based
the deterrence rationale "necessarily assumes" willful, or at least negligent, violation of the Fourth
Amendment)).
169. Id. at 920-21.
170. Id. at 921.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 923.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979)).
176. Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 442 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. Id. Justice Blackmun acknowledged "the shortage of hard data concerning the behavior of
police officers in the absence of [the exclusionary] rule." Id. Therefore, according to Justice
Blackmun, the Court's empirical judgment was unavoidable in light of the Court's responsibility to
decide the issue presented to it. Id.
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"cannot be cast in stone." 180 The scope of the exclusionary rule must
change as judicial understanding of the effects of the rule changes.'1
8
Justice Brennan, joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, attacked the
deterrence rationale underlying the exclusionary rule.182 Applying the
deterrence rationale only to law enforcement officers ignores the fact
that judges, when they admit illegally obtained evidence, engage in a
single Fourth Amendment violation.18 3 Brennan also attacked the "cost
of excluding reliable evidence" argument underlying the deterrence
rationale.' 8 4 First, the loss of reliable evidence is the price of the Fourth
Amendment itself, not the cost of the exclusionary rule.185 Second, the
mere attempt to determine, honestly or accurately, the costs and benefits
of the exclusionary rule is nearly impossible.1 86 Even if the deterrence
rationale were plausible, its intended application is as a systematic deter-
rence against law enforcement agents generally, not as a specific deter-
rence against law enforcement officers individually; therefore, a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule is erroneous.' 8 7
Justice Brennan also warned that the majority's decision would have
several "grave consequences." 188 First, the ruling was an implicit mes-
sage to judges and magistrates that their mistakes will no longer have any
significant consequence. 8 9 Second, the ruling "completely vitiated"
any previously existing incentive to adequately establish probable
cause. 190 Third, the ruling could not be justified with Illinois v. Gates,191
180. Id. at 927-28.
181. Id. at 928.
182. Id. at 929-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 933. Brennan argued:
[Ilf the [Fourth] Amendment is to have any meaning, police and the courts cannot be
regarded as constitutional strangers to each other; because the evidence-gathering role
of the police is directly linked to the evidence-admitting function of the courts, an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights may be undermined as completely by one as by the
other.
Id. at 938 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914)).
184. Id. at 940-43.
185. Id. at 941. Generally, it is assumed that had the law enforcement officer simply abided by
the Fourth Amendment in the first place, the same evidence would not have been obtained. Id. at 941
n.8 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 942. Even where empirical data are available, the benefits of the exclusionary rule
are significantly indeterminable, and the costs are less substantial than critics suggest. Id.
187. Id. at 953 & n.12 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan explained that exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence demonstrates society's interest in punishing Fourth Amendment violations, which in
turn encourages the incorporation of Fourth Amendment ideals into the policies and value systems of
law enforcement agencies. Id. at 954. Therefore, application of the deterrence rationale to good
faith violations will still have a significant deterrent effect by encouraging greater care and attention
in applying for and reviewing warrants. Id. at 955.
188. Id. at 956.
189. Id. In other words, Justice Brennan maintained, if the warrant is valid, the evidence is ad-
missible; if the warrant is invalid, but law enforcement officers rely on it in good faith, the evidence is
still admissible. Id.
190. Id. at 957. So long as a warrant was issued under circumstances that were not "entirely un
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in which the Court relaxed the standard for assessing probable cause. 192
The Gates and Leon standards "overlap so completely" that the majori-
ty's good faith exception could only apply where there was "objectively
reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant," a
concept Justice Brennan found "mindboggling."1 93
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent, expressing his view that "an
official search and seizure cannot be both 'unreasonable' and 'reason-
able' at the same time." 194 Without probable cause, there can be no
reasonable reliance. 195 Prior to the majority's opinion, the law on this
issue was well-settled: The mere issuance of a warrant does not guaran-
tee that the ensuing search and seizure is reasonable.196 Justice Stevens
pointed to the fact that magisterial authorization of general warrants did
not make the colonial officers' searches and seizures "reasonable."1 97
2. State Response to United States v. Leon
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires
states to follow federal precedent as the minimum protection provided to
a citizen. 198 However, states are free to provide greater protection under
their state constitutions than is provided under the federal constitution.199
The good faith exception reduces the protection afforded by the exclu-
sionary rule; therefore, states are free to accept or reject the good faith
exception as a matter of state constitutional law. 200 Eleven states, as well
as the District of Columbia, have adopted a good faith exception under
their state constitution through judicial opinion. 20 1 Five states have
reasonable," courts would not need to review the conduct of law enforcement officers acting in
accordance with that warrant. Id.
191. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
192. Leon, 468 U.S. at 958 (discussing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (adopting a
"totality of circumstances" approach to determine probable cause)).
193. Id. at 958-59.
194. Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented from the judgment in Leon and
concurred in the judgment in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). Id.
195. Id. at 966-67.
196. Id. at 969-70.
197. Id. at 972.
198. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring that states "shall be bound" by "[the] Constitution and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof").
199. See generally Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (recognizing "the State's power
to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution").
200. See generally id.
201. The 11 states are California (People v. Camarella, 818 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1991); People v.
Helmquist, 207 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)); District of Columbia (United States v. Edelen,
529 A.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987)); Florida (Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988));
Iowa (State v. Beckett, 532 N.W.2d 751, 755 (Iowa 1995)); Kentucky (Crayton v. Commonwealth,
846 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky. 1992)); Louisiana (State v. Ebey, 491 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1986));
Missouri (State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Mo. 1986) (discussing State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d
420, 426 (Mo. 1985))); Montana (State v. Peterson, 741 P.2d 392, 394 (Mont. 1987) (dissent)); Ohio
(State v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236, 1238-39 (Ohio 1986)); South Dakota (State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d
825, 828 (S.D. 1988)); Virginia (McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (Va. 1984)); and
Wisconsin (State v. Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517, 531 (Wis. 2000)).
144
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adopted a good faith exception by statute.202 Fourteen states have reject-
ed a good faith exception under their state constitution. 203 Twenty states
have either not addressed or declined to rule on the issue. 204
The states that have adopted a good faith exception under their state
constitutions have generally adopted the reasoning of the Leon majority,
with little, if any, additional analysis. 205 Often, this results from a judicial
202. The five states are Arizona (ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999));
Colorado (CoLO. REV. STAT. A NN. § 16-3-308 (1999)); Illinois (725 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/114-12)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1999)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-5 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999)); and
Texas (TEx. CR.. P. CODE ANN. ART. 38.23(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000)).
203. The 14 states are Connecticut (State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 60 (Conn. 1990)); Georgia
(Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 428 (Ga. 1992)); Hawaii (State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 902 (Haw.
1995)); Idaho (State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 667 (Idaho 1992)); Michigan (People v. Sundling, 395
N.W.2d 308, 315 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (overruled on other grounds)); New Hampshire (State v.
Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (N.H. 1995)); New Jersey (State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857
(N.J. 1987)); New Mexico (State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1993)); New York (People
v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1985)); North Carolina (State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562
(N.C. 1988)); Oklahoma (Solis-Avila v. State, 830 P.2d 191, 192 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992));
Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-06 (Pa. 1991)); Vermont (State v.
Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 121 (Vt. 1991)); and Washington (State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773, 776 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1991)).
204. The 20 states are Alabama (State v. Hill, 690 So. 2d 1201, 1207 n.3 (Ala. 1996)); Alaska
(Jackson v. State, 926 P.2d 1180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)); Arkansas (Jackson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 831,
833 (Ark. 1987) (deciding the good faith exception under the federal, not state constitution));
Delaware (State v. Fleming, Nos. 93-05-0200 to -0205, 0421, 1994 WL 233938, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.
May 11, 1994)); Kansas (State v. Longbine, 896 P.2d 367, 372-73 (Kan. 1995) (resolving the issue
under the federal constitution)); Maine (State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me. 1993) (resolving
the issue under the federal constitution)); Maryland (Connelly v. State, 589 A.2d 958, 966-67 (Md.
1991) (deciding the good faith exception under the federal, not state constitution)); Massachusetts
(Commonwealth v. Hecox, 619 N.E.2d 339, 342 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that
"Massachusetts has not adopted under State law the 'good faith' doctrine of United States v. Leon")
(citing Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 539 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Mass. 1989))); Minnesota (State v. Zanter,
535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995) (declining to address the applicability of a good faith exception
under the state constitution)); Mississippi (Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837, 841 (Miss. 1986) (in
dissent)); Nebraska (State v. Johnson, 589 N.W.2d 108, 117-18 (Neb. 1999) (deciding the good faith
issue according on federal, not state, constitutional grounds)); Nevada (Pointe v. State, 717 P.2d 38,
42-43 (Nev. 1986) (overruled on other grounds) (resolving the issue according to the federal
constitution)); North Dakota (State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 127, 588 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Herrick I));
Oregon (State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 758-59 (Or. 1987)); Rhode Island (State v. Nunez, 634 A.2d
1167, 1171 (R.I. 1993) (declining "to consider whether [to] adopt the 'good faith exception"')); South
Carolina (State v. Austin, 409 S.E.2d 811, 816-17 (S.C. 1991)); Tennessee (State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d
861, 871 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that Tennessee "[has] not yet addressed the good faith exception") (in
dissent)); State v. Taylor, No. 86-144-Ill, 1987 WL 25417, at **6-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4. 1987));
Utah (State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 1991) (leaving "for another day the issue of
whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution")); West Virginia (State v. Lilly, 461 S.E.2d 101, 111 n.16
(W. Va. 1995)); and Wyoming (Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 449 (Wyo. 1989) (declining "to
address the issue of whether [Wyoming] should adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule")).
205. See generally Crayton, 846 S.W.2d at 689 (adopting the deterrence rationale of Leon);
Ebey, 491 So. 2d at 500 (adopting the deterrence rationale of Leon); Brown, 708 S.W.2d at 145
(modifying, implicitly, Missouri's judicially created exclusionary rule to allow for Leon's good-faith
exception); Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d at 1247 (adopting the deterrence rationale of Leon); Saiz, 427
N.W.2d at 828 (finding Leon persuasive and adopting its deterrence rationale); McCary, 321 S.E.2d at
644 (embracing the recently announced "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule); Ward, 604
N.W.2d at 530 (discussing the development of the exclusionary rule "to deter unreasonable searches
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intent to interpret the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the
state constitution consistently with the Fourth Amendment. 206 Two
states--California and Florida-are required to adopt this interpretation
under their state constitutions.
207
Not all states accept the good faith doctrine. 208 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Edmunds,209 rejected the good
faith exception under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 210  Edmunds held
that adopting a good faith exception under state law "would frustrate the
guarantees embodied in Article I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution]."211 To reach its holding, the Edmunds court distinguished the
purpose of the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania from the United State
Supreme Court's "metamorphosed view" of the exclusionary rule.2 12
In Calandra, the United States Supreme Court began to suggest that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule "is not to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim [but, rather,] to deter future unlawful police
conduct." 2 13 In Leon, the Court held that the sole purpose for the
exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct and that the rule was
and seizures").
206. See generally Beckett, 532 N.W.2d at 755 (recognizing the court's interest in harmonizing
its constitutional decisions with those of the Supreme Court and its consistent refusal to provide greater
protection against searches and seizures under its state constitution than under the Fourth
Amendment).
207. See People v. Camarella, 818 P.2d 63, 64 (Cal. 1991) (holding that, by virtue of Article I,
Section 28(d) of the California Constitution, the good faith issue is "purely one of federal constitutional
law"); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988) (holding that, by virtue of Article I, Section
12 of the Florida Constitution, the court is "bound to follow the interpretations of the United States
Supreme Court with relation to the [F]ourth [A]mendment, and provide no greater protection than
those interpretations"). Article I, Section 28(d) of the California Constitution provides, in relevant
part, that "[e]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted .... relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding..." CAL CONST. art. I, § 28(d). Article I, Section 12 of the
Florida Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means. . . . shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.
FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
208. See supra note 203.
209. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
210. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-06 (Pa. 1991). Edmunds involved a search
warrant that was facially invalid, in that the affidavit did not state, with the requisite specificity, the
date the informants observed the drugs sought by the police. Id. at 888. The trial court nonetheless
allowed the admission of the evidence obtained through the execution of the warrant. Id. Applying
the rationale of Leon, the trial court held that the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. Id. The
superior court, also relying on Leon, affirmed. Id.
211. Id. at 895. Article I, Section 8 is the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution which pro-
vides security against unreasonable searches and seizures. PA. CONST. art I, § 8. The court deter-
mined that, although Article I, Section 8 "is similar to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, we are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images."
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895 (citation omitted).
212. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897.
213. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
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"a judicially created remedy . . . rather than a personal constitutional
right."214 Cases in Pennsylvania, however, manifest an unshakable link
between Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and "the
implicit right to privacy." 215
Other states have applied a rationale similar to that in Edmunds to
reject a good faith exception under their state constitutions. 216 Still
others have agreed with Justice Brennan's dissent in Leon, criticizing the
majority's deterrence rationale. 217 One state, Georgia, has statutorily
rejected a good faith exception under state law.218
The states that have declined to rule on the issue of a good faith
exception under their state constitutions have generally done so because
the argument-that the state constitution provides greater protection than
the federal constitution-was not raised on appeal and was therefore not
properly before the court.219
214. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 916 (1984).
215. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 898 (citations omitted).
216. See generally State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 902 (Haw. 1995) (holding that protecting the
right of privacy is a purpose of the exclusionary rule equally valuable to deterring governmental
violations); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (N.H. 1995) (holding that "the good faith exception is
incompatible with and detrimental to [the] strong right of privacy inherent in part I, article 19 [of the
New Hampshire Constitution]") (citing Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052,
1053 (N.M. 1993) (holding that "the good-faith exception is incompatible with the guarantees of the
New Mexico Constitution that prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures"); State v. Crawley, 808
P.2d 773, 776 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) ("The important place of the right to privacy in [the Washington
Constitution] seems to us to require that whenever the right is unreasonably violated, the
[exclusionary] remedy must follow") (citation omitted).
217. See generally State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 63-68 (Conn. 1990) (criticizing the majority
opinion in Leon); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671-77 (Idaho 1992) (criticizing the majority opinion
in Leon); People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d 308, 314-15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (questioning "the utility
of the good-faith exception") (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 949-51) (Brennan, J., dissenting); State v.
Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 126 (Vt. 1991) (finding unpersuasive "the [Supreme] Court's conclusions in
Leon concerning the costs and benefits of a good faith exception") (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 943
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
218. See Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 428 (Ga. 1992) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-30 (Har-
rison 1998 & Supp. 1999)). Official Code of Georgia Annotated Section 17-5-30 provides, in relevant
part, that:
(a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court... to
suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the grounds that:
(2) [t]he search and seizure with a warrant was illegal because . . . there was not
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant ....
(b) ... If the motion is granted the property ... shall not be admissible in evidence
against the movant in any trial.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-30 (Harrison 1998 & Supp. 1999).
219. See generally State v. Austin, 409 S.E.2d 811, 816-17 (S.C. 1991). Chief Judge Sanders of
the Court of Appeals of South Carolina put it best:
Because Mr. Austin has not argued for reversal based on Article I, § 10, we cannot
answer the question of whether a good faith exception exists under the State Constitution.
"[A]ppellate courts in this state, like well-behaved children, do not speak unless spoken
to and do not answer questions they are not asked." Undoubtedly, the question will be
answered some day. Regrettably, today is not that day.
Id. (citations omitted). The first Herrick case fell into this category. See State v. Herrick, 1997 N.D.
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Other courts have declined to rule on the issue either because the
evidence was admissible on grounds other than good faith, or because
the officers' conduct was so unreasonable that the good faith exception
would not have applied even had the court adopted a good faith
exception. 220
D. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
In summary, the knock-and-announce requirement ordinarily
requires law enforcement officers to knock and announce their presence
and authority before entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant. 22 1
If they do not do so, and if none of the exceptions to the knock-and-
announce requirement applies, the search is unconstitutional, and the
155, 26, 567 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Herrick I) (declining "to decide the question [of whether we should
or should not recognize a good-faith exception] at this time without adequate briefing"). The second
Herrick case held the evidence inadmissible on other than constitutional grounds, so the good faith
issue was again left open. See State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 1 27, 588 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Herrick 11)
(holding that because "[t]he issue ... is a violation of a statute ... and not a violation of [the state
constitution]," the court need not decide whether the state constitution "preclude[s] a good-faith
exception").
220. See generally State v. Fleming, Nos. 93-05-0200 to -0205, -0421, 1994 WL 233938, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. May 11, 1994) (upholding the validity of a warrant where only the lack of the
officer's signature was in noncompliance); State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 759 (Or. 1987) ("[T]he
search or seizure must violate the defendant's [state constitutional] rights before evidence obtained
thereby will be suppressed; a defendant's [state constitutional] rights are not violated merely by
admitting evidence obtained in violation of [the state constitution]"). Prior to the Herrick cases, North
Dakota caselaw fell into this category. See State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658, 663 (N.D. 1995)
(deciding that "[e]ven if we were to follow the good-faith exception, an issue we have yet to decide,"
it was not "objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant"); State v. Dymowski, 458
N.W.2d 490, 499 n.3 (N.D. 1990) (declining to decide on the good faith issue on the grounds that there
was probable cause to issue to warrant and that the lower court did not raise or address the good faith
issue); State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 415, 422-23 (N.D. 1989) (leaving open the good faith issue on the
ground that probable cause was so lacking that the officers could not have reasonably relied on the
warrant); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 838 n.6 (N.D. 1989) (declining to rule on the good
faith issue as it was not argued by the state); State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 216 n.4 (N.D. 1988)
(stating that since probable cause existed, it was unnecessary to decide the good faith issue); State v.
Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 785 n.5 (N.D. 1985) (noting that "Leon is of no assistance," since the
officers' conduct was not objectively reasonable); State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 876 n.10 (N.D.
1985) (overruled on other grounds) (noting that it was "[un]necessary to consider the 'good faith'
exception" since the challenged warrants were validly based on evidence obtained during a lawful,
"plain view" seizure); State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 370-72 (N.D. 1985) (discussing the Leon
analysis and finding that "even if we were to apply ...the Leon good-faith rule," it was not
reasonable for the officer to rely on the warrant); State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 230 n.1 (N.D.
1985) (noting that since probable cause existed, it was unnecessary to rule on the good faith issue);
State v. Gronlund, 356 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1984) (concluding that the officers' reasonable reading
of a search warrant was "in keeping with" the Leon good faith exception emphasizing reasonable
reliance); State v. Metzner, 338 N.W.2d 799, 800 n.l (N.D. 1983) (declining, prior to Leon, to adopt a
good faith exception on the grounds that probable cause existed to issue the warrant and that the issue
was neither argued in the lower court nor raised by the State on appeal).
221. See generally Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (holding that the knock-and




evidence obtained thereby will normally be inadmissible in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief, unless one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule
applies.222 Prior to Leon, the exceptions to the exclusionary rule were
premised on the theory that the illegal search or seizure did not
contribute to the discovery of the challenged evidence. 223 Leon, how-
ever, created an exception to the exclusionary rule which makes irrele-
vant the fact that the illegal search or seizure did in fact result in the
discovery of the challenged evidence. 224 So long as the search or seizure
was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant,
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, the evidence is admissible in
the prosecution's case in chief, even if it is later held that the warrant's
invalidity rendered the search or seizure unconstitutional. 225
III. ANALYSIS
Herrick J 2 26 was decided by a three-to-one majority, which held
that the Leon good faith exception applied to violations of North Dakota
Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) when the search warrant was issued
on a per se basis prior to the Herrick I decision.2 27 Justice Neumann
wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justice Sandstrom and
Chief Justice VandeWalle. 228 Justice Maring wrote a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which she stressed the
court's need to address the issue of whether to accept or reject the good
faith exception under the North Dakota Constitution.229 Justice Sand-
strom wrote a separate concurrence, in which he attacked the basis for
Justice Maring's opinion that the court should reject the good faith
exception under the North Dakota Constitution. 230
222. See generally Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36 (listing circumstances where law enforcement
officers may enter a dwelling without first announcing their presence and authority); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmis-
sible, both in federal and state courts); Fabi, supra note 34, at 946-48 (discussing exceptions to the
exclusionary rule).
223. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,442-44 (1984) (discussing the inevitable discovery excep-
tion); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (applying the attenuation or purged taint
exception); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 382, 392 (1920) (discussing the
independent source exception).
224. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding that evidence directly obtained
pursuant to an invalid warrant may be admissible at trial).
225. See idL
226. 1999 N.D. 1,588 N.W.2d 847 (Herrick 11).
227. State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 1 28, 588 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Herrick 11). Justice Meschke
was a member of the North Dakota Supreme Court when Herrick 11 was argued, but he retired before
the court decided the case and took no part in its decision. Id. 30.
228. Id. It 1-29, 588 N.W.2d at 848-52.
229. Id. 39-56, 588 N.W.2d at 853-57.
230. Id. I 32-38, 588 N.W.2d at 852-53.
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority decided two separate issues. First, the court deter-
mined the appropriate remedy for a violation of North Dakota Century
Code section 19-03.1-32(3).23 1 Second, the court discussed whether the
North Dakota Constitution provides greater protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures than the federal constitution. 232
1. North Dakota Century Code Section 19-03.1-32(3) and
the Appropriate Remedy For Its Violation
In the first part of its opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined the appropriate remedy for the violation of North Dakota
Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3).233 Although Herrick II concerned
the violation of a statute, not a constitutional right, the court looked to
remedies granted for violations of constitutional rights to determine the
appropriate remedy for a violation of North Dakota Century Code
section 19-03.1-32(3).234 In its analysis, the court relied on Professor
Wayne R. LaFave's treatise, Search & Seizure.235
The legislature did not specify a remedy for a violation North
Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) when it enacted the
statute.236 Nor did the court find any legislative history pertinent to the
remedy issue.237 It was, therefore, the duty of the court to determine the
appropriate remedy. 238 Where a statute does not explicitly provide a
remedy for its violation, and the guidance of legislative history is
unavailable, LaFave suggests that a court determine whether violation of
the statute significantly affects a substantial right.239 Based on Wilson
and Richards, the court determined that North Dakota Century Code
section 19-03.1-32(3) "implicates a substantial right under the Fourth
Amendment." 240
231. Id. I 8-20, 588 N.W.2d at 849-51.
232. Id. " 21-27, 588 N.W.2d at 851-52.
233. Id. 8-20, 588 N.W.2d at 849-51.
234. Id. 10-11,588 N.W.2d at 849.
235. Id. (citing LAFAvE, supra note 22, § 1.5(b), at 132-36).
236. Id. I 10. Some statutes expressly provide for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation
of the statute, even where a violation of the statute may not also violate the Fourth Amendment. See
LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 1.5(b), at 132 (citing 18 U.S.C.A § 2515, the federal wiretapping and
electronic surveillance statute).
237. Herrick II, 11, 588 N.W.2d at 849. If the legislature's view on the appropriate remedy is
not explicitly stated in the statute, LaFave advises a court to consider any available legislative history.
See LAFAvE, supra note 22, § 1.5(b), at 133.
238. Herrick 1l, 110-I 1,588 N.W.2d at 849.
239. See LAFAvE, supra note 22, § 1.5(b), at 133.
240. Herrick I1, U 9-10, 588 N.W.2d at 849 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396
(11997) (rejecting a "blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug
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The court then considered whether suppression was an appropriate
remedy. 241 To obtain a no-knock warrant under North Dakota Century
Code section 19-03.1-32(3), law enforcement officers must have evi-
dence sufficient to establish probable cause that giving notice of their
authority and purpose would result in the loss of evidence or endanger
the safety of the officers; thus, the statute implicates a concern about the
quality of evidence. 242 Officers executing a search pursuant to North
Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) "without notice of [their]
authority and purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or win-
dow . . ."; thus, the statute also implicates a concern about the manner of
entry. 243 Accordingly, the court determined that the proper remedy for
violation of North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) is
exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result thereof.244
The court determined that, because the exclusionary remedy is
derived from the Fourth Amendment, it "must also consider" the Leon
good faith exception. 245 Herrick argued that the affidavit and applica-
tion for the no-knock warrant were so lacking in indicia of probable
cause that a reasonable person could not believe the warrant to be
valid. 246 Therefore, Herrick argued, the Leon good faith exception did
not apply because the officers' reliance on the warrant could not have
been objectively reasonable. 247 If the officers' reliance was not objective-
ly reasonable, the Leon good faith exception would not apply, and the
court would have to exclude the evidence. 248
investigations"); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (holding that the common-law knock-
and-announce principle is an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry)). The court
did not analyze the "substantial right" issue beyond restating the holdings of Wilson and Richards, then
concluding "it cannot be disputed N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-32(3) ... implicates a substantial right under the
Fourth Amendment." Herrick 11, 1 9-10, 588 N.W.2d at 849 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 396;
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934).
241. Herrick I, 1 12, 588 N.W.2d at 849.
242. N.D. CENr. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1997 & Supp. 1999).
243. Id.
244. Herrick II, 1 11, 588 N.W.2d at 849. LaFave notes that where the statute "concerns the
quality of evidence needed for issuance of the warrant ... or the manner in which entry is to be
gained in order to execute the warrant," suppression is an appropriate remedy for violation of the
statute. LAFAvE, supra note 22, § 1.5(b), at 136. LaFave explains that "whether the rule or statute ex-
ceeds the requirements of the Fourth Amendment" is typically of no consequence when the rule or
statute implicates these concerns, as they are "more directly related to Fourth Amendment protec-
tions." LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 1.5(b), at 136. The court observed that the "probable cause"
standard of North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) exceeds the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonable suspicion" standard. Herrick 11,. 10, 588 N.W.2d at 849.
245. Herrick ii, It 8-9 588 N.W.2d at 849 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984) (creating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule where officers' reliance on a
magistrate's determination of probable cause was "objectively reasonable")).
246. Id. 16, 588 N.W.2d at 850.
247. Id. (citing Leon, 486 U.S. at 923 (holding that suppression remains an appropriate remedy
where a warrant is "based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable"')).
248. See Leon, 486 U.S. at 923.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed. 249 At the time the
warrant was issued, North Dakota's per se drug exception to the knock-
and-announce requirement-allowing a no-knock warrant to be issued
any time law enforcement officers suspected the presence of drugs-was
still valid law. 250 Under that law, the court reasoned, the validity of a no-
knock warrant issued in a drug case would not have been questioned.25 1
The court determined that the then-valid per se drug exception supplied
the officers with indicia of probable cause. 252 As such, the officers'
reliance on the no-knock warrant was objectively reasonable.253 Under
federal precedent, therefore, the court determined that the good faith
exception applied to the warrant. 254
2. The North Dakota Constitution and Whether it Provides
Greater Protection Than the Federal Constitution
In the second part of its opinion, the court addressed whether the
North Dakota Constitution provides greater protection than the federal
constitution, thus preventing the application of a good faith exception
under state law.255 The court found it to be "axiomatic" that the state
constitution may provide greater protection than the federal consti-
tution. 256 However, the interpretation of the state constitution must be
based on "the rights and liberties it was created to uphold," not the
philosophies of the justices who are responsible for its interpretation. 257
Relying on an article in the North Dakota Law Review, written by
former North Dakota Supreme Court Justice Herbert L. Meschke and
Lawrence D. Spears, the court looked to similar provisions in other state
249. Herrick I1, 16, 588 N.W.2d at 850.
250. Id. 18.
251. Id.
252. Id. 20, 588 N.W.2d at 850-51.
253. Id. at 851. Former North Dakota Supreme Court Justice Herbert L. Meschke maintains that,
even before Herrick 1, federal precedent had "clearly established" that per se drug exceptions to the
knock-and-announce requirement were "patently unjustifiable." See Herbert L. Meschke, When
Should, Ignorance Trump the Constitution? Another Dissent from Herrick II, 75 N.D. L. R Ev. 747, 757
(1999) (quoting United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 850 (8th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, former
Justice Meschke contends that North Dakota law enforcement officers could not have acted in
objective, reasonable reliance on a warrant issued pursuant to such a per se rule. Id. at 758. As
former Justice Meschke correctly reasons, the warrant in Moore was upheld because, at the time the
warrant was issued, there were no federal precedents holding that per se drug exceptions were
unconstitutional. See Moore, 956 F.2d at 851; Meschke, supra, at 757. Former Justice Meschke states
that the Herrick II majority "overlooked the real effect of the holding in Moore." Meschke, supra, at
752.
254. Herrick II, 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851 (citing Moore, 956 F.2d at 851 (holding, under the cir-
cumstances, that the good faith exception applied to a no-knock warrant issued under a blanket rule
permitting no-knock warrants to be issued in all drug cases)).
255. Id. (N 21-27, 588 N.W.2d at 851-52.
256. Id. 22, 588 N.W.2d at 851.
257. Id.
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constitutions. 258 In particular, it looked to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania's holding in Edmunds, which rejected the good faith exception
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 259 In distinguishing the Edmunds
holding, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted the differences between
Pennsylvania's constitutional history and North Dakota's constitutional
history. 260 While acknowledging that privacy is "an important right"
under the North Dakota Constitution, the court distinguished North
Dakota's constitutional history by concluding that privacy has not been
"unequivocally distinguished" as "the major factor" in the application
of the exclusionary rule.261 The court did note its prior decision in State
v. Phelps,2 62 in which it held that the exclusionary remedy furthers the
operation of the Fourth Amendment as a safeguard against unwarranted
intrusions by the state into personal privacy and dignity. 263 North
Dakota precedent, however, did not provide the same "clear guidance"
as that provided by Pennsylvania's constitutional history.
264
Ultimately, the court declined to decide whether the North Dakota
Constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution.
265
The court found that the issue did not involve a violation of the state
constitution, but rather a violation of a state statute. 266 As such, the court
did not reach the issue whether the state constitution provides greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment. 267 Consequently, the court also
did not reach the issue whether the North Dakota Constitution precludes
a good faith exception to North Dakota's exclusionary rule. 2 6 8 The
court held only that the Leon good faith exception applies to a violation
258. Id. 1 24 (discussing Herbert L. Meschke & Lawrence D. Spears, Digging for Roots: The
North Dakota Constitution and the Thayer Correspondence, 65 N.D. L. REV. 343, 379-80 (1989)).
Former Justice Meschke was a member of the North Dakota Supreme Court when he co-authored the
Digging for Roots article.
259. Id. 25 (discussing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-06 (Pa. 1991)).
260. Id. 26, 588 N.W.2d at 851-52.
261. Id. (citing State v. Wahl, 450 N.W.2d 710, 714 (N.D. 1990); State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d
779, 783 (N.D. 1985) (interpreting North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-08 as requiring a law
enforcement officer to give notice of his authority and purpose before entering a dwelling to execute
a search warrant)).
262. 286 N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 1979).
263. Herrick II, 1 26, 588 N.W.2d at 852 (citing State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D.
1979) (holding that the seizure of the defendant's clothing was unreasonable because the seizure was
not incident to a lawful arrest and that although the police had probable cause to believe the suspect
had committed a crime, the conduct of the police did not constitute "a very limited intrusion" and the
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of North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3), when the
violation results from a no-knock warrant issued, pre-Herrick I, on a per
se basis. 269
B. JUSTICE MARING'S CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Maring wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. 270 She dissented because, in her view, the remand in
Herrick I was clearly based upon constitutional issues.271 Had the issue
been merely one of statutory interpretation, remand would have been
unnecessary. 272 It was, therefore, the court's duty to interpret the
constitution independently. 273
According to Justice Maring, a court interpreting a constitution
should look first to the constitution's text to determine intent and
purpose. 274 If a provision is ambiguous, as Justice Maring determined
was the case with Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution,
other factors must be considered to make this determination. 275 Justice
Maring reiterated these factors as "the object to be accomplished; the
prior state of the law; and the contemporaneous and practical
constructions." 276 As to the object to be accomplished, neither the jour-
nal of the constitutional convention nor its official report was helpful in
construing the search and seizure provision. 277 Justice Maring instead
found support in both North Dakota history and the history of the North
Dakota Constitution, which, in her view, evinced an intent not only to
protect individual rights against outside interests, but also to provide
greater protection than the federal constitution. 278
269. Id.
270. Id. 11 39-56 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271. Id. 43, 588 N.W.2d at 854.
272. Id. It is unclear from the opinion why the court in Herrick I could have interpreted a statu-
tory issue, but a remand to the trial court was apparently necessary for constitutional issues. See id.
273. Id.144.
274. Id. (citing State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 160 N.W. 514, 516 (1916)).
275. Id. (citing Lynn Boughey, An Introduction to North Dakota Constitutional Law: Contents and
Methods of Interpretation, 63 N.D. L. REV. 157, 219 n.502 (1987)).
276. Id. (citing Robinson, 160 N.W. at 516); see also Boughey, supra note 275 at 217-225 (listing
the same three factors).
277. Herrick I, 45, 588 N.W.2d at 854-55.
278. Id. (citing Boughey, supra note 275, at 242-43, 253-59). Boughey explains that "the origin
of the movement for statehood stemmed not only from the desire of independence, but also from the
desire to throw off outside control and to disengage the minions of corruption." Boughey, supra note
275, at 243. This outside control was wielded by the railroads---and their "minions of corruption"---as
the price for "open[ing] North Dakota to the outside world and over[coming] its remoteness."
Boughey, supra note 275, at 242-43. The railroads attempted to preserve their power by appointing
officials to the territorial legislature and by delaying statehood. See Boughy, supra note 275, at 242.
Regarding the differences between the North Dakota Constitution and the federal constitution,
Boughey concluded that "the federal constitution served as a guide ... a starting point," but that the
framers of the North Dakota Constitution chose to "creat[e] a document substantially more detailed
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As to contemporaneous constructions, Justice Maring established
that the federal constitution was not the model upon which the North
Dakota Constitution was formulated. 279 Rather, the search and seizure
provision was based upon the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as
"[C]onstitutions generally." 280 The construction of Article I, Section 8
of the Pennsylvania Constitution was therefore important guidance in
interpreting Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution
because of the clear link between the two constitutions.281 Justice Mar-
ing emphasized that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed its Arti-
cle I, Section 8 as precluding a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.
2 8 2
Justice Maring discussed the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held itself not bound to construe Article I, Section 8 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution "as if they were mirror images." 2 83 She then cited several
decisions in which the North Dakota Supreme Court found greater
individual rights under the state constitution than under the federal
constitution. 284
and containing expanded rights." Boughey, supra note 275, at 256.
279. Herrick I, 1 46, 588 N.W.2d at 855 (citing Honorable Robert Vogel, Sources of the 1889
North Dakota Constitution, 65 N.D. L. REV. 331, 332, 342 (1989)). Vogel explains that "only two
complete draft constitutions ... were submitted to the convention when North Dakota's [constitution]
was drafted." Vogel, supra, at 332. One was the South Dakota Constitution, the other "was the
so-called Williams Constitution," which was authored by Harvard Law School Professor James
Bradley Thayer and submitted by Delegate Erastus A. Williams. Vogel, supra, at 332.
280. Herrick 1H, 1 46, 588 N.W.2d at 855 (citing Meschke & Spears, supra note 258, at 379 n.
251, 481). Meschke and Spears chart the correlation between the present North Dakota Constitution
and a draft constitution authored by Washington F. Peddrick, referred to as "Peddrick draft No. 2."
Meschke & Spears, supra note 258, at 379 n. 251, 481.
281. Herrick II, 1 47, 588 N.W.2d at 855 (citing Meschke & Spears, supra note 258, at 381).
282. Id. 48 (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. 1991)).
283.. Id. 49 (citing Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896).
284. Id. 1 51-52, 588 N.W.2d at 856 (citing Grand Forks-Traill Water Users v. Hjelle, 413
N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987) (recognizing that the takings provision of the North Dakota Constitution
is broader than the corresponding provision of the federal constitution, protecting "not only the
possession of property, but also those rights which make possession valuable") (citation omitted); State
v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177-78 (N.D. 1985) (holding that "the right to counsel under the North
Dakota Constitution ... may be exercised independently of any compulsion under federal law or the
federal constitution.") (footnote and citation omitted); City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760,
766 (N.D. 1984) (recognizing that North Dakota may grant broader rights to a jury trial than those
guaranteed in the federal constitution) (citations omitted); State v. Nordquist, 309 N.W.2d 109, 113
(N.D. 1981) (declaring that the North Dakota Constitution allows the legislature to establish greater
protection against grand jury investigations than is provided by the federal constitution); State v. Lewis,
291 N.W.2d 735, 737 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the North Dakota Constitution grants criminal appeals
"as a matter of right, and not by permission of the court or by some form of certiorari," as under the
federal constitution); State v. Stockert, 245 N.W.2d 266, 271 (N.D. 1976) (recognizing that the search
and seizure provision of the North Dakota Constitution may create higher standards for warrantless
searches than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution) (citations omitted); Johnson v.
Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 776 (N.D. 1974) (finding that, "under a dual constitutional system," statutes
may be declared unconstitutional under the North Dakota Constitution even where they "might have
passed the federal constitutional screening") (citations omitted); State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 99
(N.D. 1974) (recognizing that the search and seizure provision of the North Dakota Constitution may
grant broader standing to contest an illegal search than is granted by the Fourth Amendment to the
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Justice Maring further contended that privacy was indeed an impor-
tant factor underlying Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitu-
tion. 285 She cited Phelps, in which the court held that safeguarding
personal privacy and dignity against unreasonable searches and seizures
was the guiding principle behind Article I, Section 8 and the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 286 She also cited State v. Sakellson,287
in which the court held that "the protection of privacy in the home"
was one of two "primary policies underlying the knock-and-announce
rule." 288
Finally, Justice Maring maintained that North Dakota Century Code
section 19-03.1-32(3) manifested a legislative intent to provide greater
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than that provided
under the federal constitution. 28 9 She cited State v. Orr29O which held
that "legislative action to 'zealously' guard a right illustrates a special
regard for that right." 291 Evidently, Justice Maring equated "special re-
gard" with "intent to provide greater protection"; thus, in her opinion,
the twenty-seven year existence of North Dakota Century Code section
19-03.1-32(3) demonstrated a legislative intent to provide greater protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures under the North Dakota
Constitution than under the United States Constitution. 292 According to
Justice Maring, the court needed to address the issue of whether Article I,
Section 8 precludes a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
"based on a thorough and considered analysis." 293
C. JUSTICE SANDSTROM'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Sandstrom wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he
attacked the "historical perspective" of Justice Maring's partial dis-
sent. 294 The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule limited only the
federal government until Mapp extended it to the states. 295 Justice Sand-
strom reasoned that the framers of the North Dakota Constitution, by
including an unreasonable searches and seizures clause, provided "a real
United States Constitution) (citations omitted)).
285. Id. 152.
286. Herrick II, 52, 588 N.W.2d at 856 (quoting State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D.
1979)).
287. 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985).
288. Herrick 11, 52, 588 N.W.2d at 856 (quoting State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D.
1985)).
289. Id. 53.
290. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
291. Herrick H, 53, 588 N.W.2d at 856 (citing State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177-78 (N.D.
1985) (recognizing that "the right to counsel under the North Dakota Constitution ... may be
exercised independently of any compulsion under federal law or the federal constitution")).
292. Id.
293. Id. 55, 588 N.W.2d at 857.
294. Id. 1 32-38, 588 N.W.2d at 852-53 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
295. Id. 34-35 (discussing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
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protection [against illegal state activity] that otherwise would have been
lacking." 296 Therefore, the clause is not "a meaningless redundancy,"
even if it was never intended to offer more protection than the Fourth
Amendment. 297
Justice Sandstrom also found nothing in either the constitutional
records of North Dakota or the jurisprudence surrounding the drafting
of the North Dakota Constitution to support Justice Maring's "impu-
tation of an exclusionary rule, let alone an exclusionary rule without a
good faith exception." 298 Even if the drafters of the North Dakota
Constitution had looked to the constitution and law of Pennsylvania,
Justice Sandstrom maintained, they would not have found an "exclu-
sionary rule without any good faith exception." 299 It was not until
Edmunds, over one hundred years after the adoption of the North
Dakota Constitution, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized
such a principle. 300
IV. IMPACT
Herrick IH is more significant for what it did not hold than for what
it held. 301 The North Dakota Supreme Court did not decide whether the
North Dakota Constitution precludes a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule; therefore, this remains an open question.
302
Two post-Herrick II cases have touched on that issue; however, the
court held in both cases that the defendant had not properly raised the
state constitutional issue, and the court therefore declined to consider
it.303 To raise a state constitutional issue properly, a defendant must do
more than merely quote the relevant state constitutional provision and
296. Id.
297. Id. n1 33, 36.
298. Id. 1 37, 588 N.W.2d at 853.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. 27, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
302. Id.
303. See State v. Van Beek, 1999 N.D. 53, 1 26 n.4, 591 N.W.2d 112, 118-19 (noting that merely
quoting the relevant provision of the state constitution is insufficient to raise a state constitutional issue
for the court's consideration); State v. Hughes, 1999 N.D. 24, 1 5, 589 N.W.2d 912, 914 (holding that
federal precedent was controlling because the argument that the state constitution provides greater
protection than the federal constitution was "not properly raised or briefed"). Both Van Beek and
Hughes followed the Herrick 11 holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied
to violations of North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3), when the search warrant was
issued on a per se basis prior to Herrick L See Van Beek, 1 26, 591 N.W.2d at 118; Hughes, 5, 589
N.W.2d at 914.
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state that it is a parallel provision to the corresponding federal constitu-
tional provision. 304  Rather, defendant must brief the argument. 305 This
is true in both criminal and civil cases.306
Herrick and the state both extensively briefed the state constitutional
issue as it concerns the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.307
Had the court determined that it was presented with a state constitutional
issue, the court likely would have given greater consideration to the good
faith argument. 308 The court found it unnecessary to rule whether a
good faith exception is precluded by the state constitution, however,
since the court determined that the case involved only the violation of a
statute. 309 Based on the extent to which both parties briefed the state
constitutional issue, it is possible that the court is waiting for the proper
case-a case which, in the court's determination, does involve a violation
of the state constitution. 310
When presented with such a case, it likely will take a strong argu-
ment to convince the North Dakota Supreme Court that it should reject a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 311 Arguing that the exclu-
sionary rule is tied to the right of privacy appears to be a fruitless
endeavor, as the majority opinion clearly distinguished the Edmunds
case, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the good faith
exception on the basis of the privacy argument. 312 Justice Sandstrom's
concurrence rejected the argument that the North Dakota Constitution
304. See Van Beek, 1 26 n.4, 591 N.W.2d at 118-19; see also State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631,
639 n.5 (N.D. 1986) (noting that merely quoting the relevant provision of the state constitution and
stating that it is a "parallel" of a provision of the federal constitution is insufficient to raise a state
constitutional issue for the court's consideration).
305. See Hughes, 5, 589 N.W.2d at 914; see also State v. Garrett, 1998 N.D. 173, 9, 584
N.W.2d 502, 504 n. 1 (noting that a bare assertion that a state constitutional provision has been violated
is insufficient to brief the state constitutional issue).
306. See generally Lund v. North Dakota State Highway Dep't, 403 N.W.2d 25, 29 n.5 (N.D.
1987). In Lund, the court found that:
Lund merely sets forth various provisions of the North Dakota Constitution and
apparently expects this court to search through the record and applicable caselaw,
although he fails to cite any, to discover deprivations of a constitutional magnitude. This
is insufficient to raise the State constitutional issues before this court, and we therefore
refrain from addressing them.
Id.; see also Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 726 n.15 (N.D. 1986) (holding that "the mere
mention of the provision in a footnote is insufficient to raise the State constitutional issue").
307. See Brief of Appellant at 18-28, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847 (Herrick
II) (Nos. 980082-84); Brief of Appellee at 3-20, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847
(Herrick II) (Nos. 980082-84).
308. See State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 26, 588 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Herrick II).
309. See id. IN 26-27.
310. See id.; Brief of Appellant at 18-28, Herrick 11 (Nos. 980082-84); Brief of Appellee at 3-20,
Herrick 11 (Nos. 980082-84).
311. Cf Herrick 1I, 21-38, 588 N.W.2d at 851-53 (considering but ultimately declining to rule
whether the North Dakota Constitution precludes a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).




precludes a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, on the ground
that the argument has no support in North Dakota's constitutional




In Herrick II, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the Leon
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of
N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-32(3), where a no-knock warrant was issued on a
per se basis prior to the court's decision in Herrick 1.315 However, the
court again declined to decide whether to adopt the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule under the state constitution. 316 Whether North
Dakota will recognize a good faith exception for violations of its state
constitution, therefore, remains an open question.
Christopher Paul Fischer
313. Id. " 36-37, 588 N.W.2d at 853 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
314. Id. 1 42-56, 588 N.W.2d at 854-57 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It
is unknown whether Justice Kapsner would have joined the majority or Justice Maring's partial
dissent. However, former Justice Meschke would certainly have joined Maring's dissent. See
Meschke, supra note 253, at 747. Interestingly, Justice Meschke was originally assigned Herrick 11
before he left the court. Discussion with former Justice Herbert L. Meschke at University of North
Dakota School of Law on April 3, 2000. Before he retired from the court, Justice Meschke wrote a
draft opinion reversing the trial court's decision. ld; see also Meschke, supra note 253.
315. Herrick Ii, 27, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
316. Id.; see also supra notes 219-20.
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